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Hybrid regulatory bodies have been credited for functioning as an
institutional bypass around the bureaucratic procedures and
providing expedient responses to the changing needs of
administrative governance. As hybrid regulatory bodies are utilized
in transnational regulation, however, concerns have arisen over the
lack of transparency and the evasion of accountability in the face of
their informality and flexibility. This article aims to explore the
issues surrounding the democratic legitimacy of transnational
hybrid administration through a case study of the Cross-Straits
Economic Cooperation Committee (CSECC) provided in the
Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement between the Straits
Exchange Foundation and the Association for Relations Across the
Taiwan Straits, two private legal bodies on behalf of Taiwan and
China, respectively. I argue that the CSECC is deliberately
designed to avoid the institutional features associated with the idea
of publicness. Both traditional constitutional design and global
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administrative law fall short of restoring the idea of publicness to
transnational hybrid administration in the hybrid cross-strait
economic regulation. As a result, the idea of publicness is
withering away in the cross-strait economic regulation, laying siege
to the democratic legitimacy of the extraconstitutional hybrid
administration across the Taiwan Strait.
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I. INTRODUCTION
“New governance” strategies have been adopted to address
multifarious governance needs and challenges facing traditional
administrative authorities.1 Among them, privatization, contracting-out
(or outsourcing), and “hybridity” are regarded as pivotal to the
organizational innovation of administration and regulation.2 Functions
1

See generally LAW AND NEW GOVERNANCE IN THE EU AND THE US (Gráinne de Búrca &
Joanne Scott eds., 2006) (addressing complex social problems and the challenges they
raise for understanding law and constitutionalism, as well as legal and constitutional
values).
2
While privatization means “the asset sale of state-owned industries,” contracting-out (or
outsourcing) refers to “entrust[ing] a private entity with a task that remains under public
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and powers that have traditionally rested with public agencies are
contracted out to institutions that are organized differently and function
independently from traditional public agencies, from which emerge new
regulatory bodies that transcend the distinction between the public agency
and the private corporation and lead to hybrid regulation and
administration.3 These new hybrid regulatory bodies have been credited
in functional terms and function as an institutional bypass around
bureaucratic procedures, providing expedient responses to the changing
needs of administrative governance at a lower price.4 Hybrid regulation
does not only gain currency in the traditional domestic regulatory
context,5 but it is also deployed beyond national borders to address the
growing needs of transnational regulation.6
However, concerns have arisen over the lack of transparency and
evasion of accountability in the face of the informality and flexibility that
is characteristic of hybrid regulatory bodies.7 These concerns are not only
that the idea of publicness, which underlies public authorities in
constitutional democracy, has been at risk with the privatization of
regulation.8 Also, as hybrid regulatory bodies are utilized in transnational
supervision and is not purely left to the market.” Jean-Bernard Auby, Contracting Out and
‘Public Values’: A Theoretical and Comparative Approach, in COMPARATIVE
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 511, 511 (Susan Rose-Ackerman & Peter L. Lindseth eds., 2010);
see also Jody Freeman, Extending Public Law Norms Through Privatization, 116 HARV. L.
REV. 1285, 1286–87 (2003) (discussing how privatization and contracting-out can be
understood as different forms of privatization in a broad sense). When the organization
that takes over the devolved governmental function is hard to characterize as public or
private, it becomes institutionally hybrid. Daphne Barak-Erez, Three Questions of
Privatization, in COMPARATIVE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, supra, at 493–97; see also Gráinne
de Búrca & Joanne Scott, Introduction: New Governance, Law and Constitutionalism, in
LAW AND NEW GOVERNANCE IN THE EU AND THE US, supra note 1, at 1, 6–9 (giving a
measure-oriented conception of hybridity).
3
See JONATHAN G.S. KOPPELL, THE POLITICS OF QUASI-GOVERNMENT: HYBRID
ORGANIZATIONS AND THE DYNAMICS OF BUREAUCRATIC CONTROL 8–12 (2003) (discussing
different types of hybrid and private regulatory bodies); William J. Novak, Public-Private
Governance: A Historical Introduction, in GOVERNMENT BY CONTRACT: OUTSOURCING
AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 23, 27–28 (Jody Freeman & Martha Minow eds., 2009)
(showing how hybrid/private bodies can be traced to the blurring of conceptions of private
and public in the Middle Ages).
4
KOPPELL, supra note 3, at 1–2.
5
See generally Martha Minow, Public and Private Partnerships: Accounting for the New
Religion, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1229 (2003) (casting historical light on the adoption of
public-private partnerships in the U.S. context).
6
Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Strengthening International Regulation Through
Transnational New Governance: Overcoming the Orchestration Deficit, 42 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT’L L. 501, 518 (2009).
7
Jody Freeman & Martha Minow, Introduction: Reframing the Outsourcing Debates, in
GOVERNMENT BY CONTRACT, supra note 3, at 1, 4–5.
8
See JÜRGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS: CONTRIBUTIONS TO A DISCOURSE
THEORY OF LAW AND DEMOCRACY 168–93 (William Rehg trans., 1996) [hereinafter
HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS]; Andrew Arato, Procedural Law and Civil
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regulation, they threaten to further upend the constitutional structure of
checks and balances with respect to foreign affairs and pose fundamental
challenges to the core of democratic legitimacy.9
In response, there has been new interest in the idea of
publicness. 10 The values of publicness have been identified in the
functioning of administrative law beyond the realm of constitutional law.
The idea of publicness is seen as embedded in the requirements of reasongiving and due process, including the rights to timely notice, meaningful
hearing, and effective judicial review. 11 For this reason, global
administrative law is praised as the antidote to secrecy and the
accountability avoidance caused by deployment of hybrid administration
in transnational regulation. 12 The problem of democratic legitimacy

Society: Interpreting the Radical Democratic Paradigm, in HABERMAS ON LAW AND
DEMOCRACY: CRITICAL EXCHANGES 26 (Michel Rosenfeld & Andrew Arato eds., 1998)
(“Without proper reflection . . . private and public autonomy are understood . . . as a zero
sum game, while democracy and constitutional rights are generally viewed in terms of
potential conflict and antagonism[.]”); see also JÜRGEN HABERMAS, THE STRUCTURAL
TRANSFORMATION OF THE PUBLIC SPHERE: AN INQUIRY INTO A CATEGORY OF BOURGEOIS
SOCIETY 1–26 (Thomas Burger trans., 1989) [hereinafter HABERMAS, STRUCTURAL
TRANSFORMATION OF THE PUBLIC SPHERE] (giving a historical account of the idea of
publicness).
9
See Christoph Engel, Hybrid Governance Across National Jurisdictions as a Challenge
to Constitutional Law, in SPONTANEOUS ORDER, ORGANIZATION AND THE LAW: ROADS TO A
EUROPEAN CIVIL SOCIETY 141, 145 (Liber Amicorum et al. eds., 2003) (critically analyzing
the challenges from transnational hybrid regulatory bodies to national constitutuional
orders); Paul Craig, Shared Administration and Networks: Global and EU Perspectives, in
VALUES IN GLOBAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 81, 107–08, 113–15 (Gordon Anthony et al. eds.,
2011) (examining the literature on policy networks).
10
John Morison & Gordon Anthony, The Place of Public Interest, in VALUES IN GLOBAL
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, supra note 9, at 215. See generally JANET NEWMAN & JOHN
CLARKE, PUBLICS, POLITICS AND POWER: REMAKING THE PUBLIC IN PUBLIC SERVICES
(2009); Benedict Kingsbury, International Law as Inter-Public Law, in MORAL
UNIVERSALISM AND PLURALISM 167 (Henry S. Richardson & Melissa S. Williams eds.,
2009) [hereinafter Kingsbury, Inter-Public Law]; Armin von Bogdandy, General
Principles of International Public Authority: Sketching a Research Field, 9 GERMAN L.J.
1909, 1918–21 (2008); Armin von Bogdandy et al., Developing the Publicness of Public
International Law: Towards a Legal Framework for Global Governance Activities, 9
GERMAN L.J. 1375 (2008); Laurence Boisson de Chazournes, Changing Roles of
International Organizations: Global Administrative Law and the Interplay of Legitimacies,
6 INT’L ORG. L. REV. 655 (2009); Benedict Kingsbury, The Concept of ‘Law’ in Global
Administrative Law, 20 EUR. J. INT’L L. 23 (2009) [hereinafter Kingsbury, Concept of
‘Law’]; Benedict Kingsbury & Lorenzo Casini, Global Administrative Law Dimensions of
International Organizations Law, 6 INT’L ORG. L. REV. 319, 353–54 (2009); Ming-Sung
Kuo, The Concept of ‘Law’ in Global Administrative Law: A Reply to Benedict Kingsbury,
20 EUR. J. INT’L L. 997, 999–1001 (2009).
11
Kingsbury, Concept of ‘Law’, supra note 10, at 41–50.
12
Benedict Kingsbury et al., The Emergence of Global Administrative Law, 68 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 15, 31–42 (2005).
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concerning transnational hybrid administration seems to find its resolution
in publicness-centered global administrative law.13
Yet, what if public authorities deliberately design a regulatory
body to stay away from the idea of publicness? What if public authorities
create a private regulatory body as a veneer to address regulatory issues,
and transnational ones at that? Under such circumstances, is global
administrative law underpinned by the idea of publicness an effective tool
to address the issues of transparency and accountability arising from what
I call an “ultra hybrid” regulatory body?14 In other words, if the deviation
from the idea of publicness is the inbuilt value, instead of merely function
run amok, does this pose a challenge to global administrative law? Does it
expose the functional limits of global administrative law in addressing the
challenges of transnational hybrid administration?
To address these issues, I present a case study in this article of the
Cross-Straits Economic Cooperation Committee (hereinafter CSECC),
provided in the Cross-Straits Economic Cooperation Framework
Agreement (hereinafter ECFA) recently signed between the Straits
Exchange Foundation (hereinafter SEF) and the Association for Relations
Across the Taiwan Straits (hereinafter ARATS), two private legal bodies
on behalf of Taiwan and China, respectively.15 The purpose of this case
study is to examine, from the perspective of Taiwan, how the idea of
publicness at the core of public authorities in constitutional democracy is
doubly strained in the face of hybrid administration in transnational
regulation.16 I argue that the CSECC is deliberately designed to avoid the
institutional features associated with the idea of publicness. It not only
bypasses the constitutional structure of checks and balances by escaping
parliamentary oversight, but this hybrid administration’s organizational
and procedural features expose the functional limits of global
administrative law. As the idea of publicness, institutionalized in the
constitutional system of checks and balances and embedded in the
functioning of global administrative law, fails to rein in the CSECC,
transnational hybrid administration raises the question of its own
democratic legitimacy.
The remainder of this article is organized as follows: in Part II, I
first analyze the legal strategy underpinning the political rapprochement
13

Id. at 50. See also Joshua Cohen & Charles F. Sabel, Global Democracy?, 37 N.Y.U. J.
INT’L L. & POL. 763 (2004) (arguing that global administration raises new accountability
problems, and that addressing the problems has important implications for democratic
practice and theory).
14
For a discussion of an “ultra hybrid regulatory body," see infra III.B.
15
STRAITS EXCHANGE FOUNDATION, CROSS-STRAITS ECONOMIC COOPERATION FRAMEWORK
AGREEMENT (2010) [hereinafter ECFA].
16
Since the focus of this article is on the impact of transnational hybrid administration on
the issues surrounding democratic legitimacy in constitutional democracy, I tackle these
issues from the perspective of Taiwan, which has a democratically elected government.
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between Taiwan and China. In Part III, I proceed to discuss how
democratic legitimacy is threatened by the use of hybrid administration in
economic regulation across the Taiwan Strait. I first establish that the
underlying idea of publicness of public authorities is institutionalized in
the constitutional system of checks and balances and in the functioning of
administrative law. Yet, this state-oriented understanding of publicness is
tenuously strained in the face of the globalizing regulatory environment.
On the one hand, transnational hybrid administration displaces the idea of
publicness embodied in the constitution as globalization has weakened
legislative oversight over transnational administrative acts. Thus, global
administrative law reflects the trend of searching for the idea of publicness
beyond the state. On the other hand, the function of global administrative
law is to keep private/hybrid administration from running amok at the cost
of public interest. However, the effect of turning to global administrative
law is constrained when facing an ultra hybrid regulatory body. I then
take a closer look at the legal framework in Taiwan that governs relations
between Taiwan and China. I argue that it not only eludes the legal
control over the executive power in a constitutional state, but also shows
that global administrative law reaches its limit in reining in hybrid/private
administration when non-publicness becomes an end in itself. Part IV
provides a summary of the argument and concludes that the idea of
publicness is withering away in the hybrid regulation across the Taiwan
Strait, and is laying siege to the democratic legitimacy of the cross-strait
hybrid administration.

II. INSTITUTIONALIZING HYBRIDITY: THE STRATEGY TO CROSS
THE TAIWAN STRAIT
This part aims to tell the story of the underlying legal strategy of
the political rapprochement between Taiwan and China. Like other cases
of conciliation between political rivals, the legal framework underpinning
the cross-strait relations was not the product of automatic legal
functioning, but has instead resulted from political decisions.17 To reveal
the relationship between law and politics in the rapprochement between
Taiwan and China, I first introduce the political background from which
the legal framework of the cross-strait relations has emerged. Law has
been creatively constructed and interpreted to provide a framework within
which cross-strait regulatory issues following the political rapprochement
can be addressed. Then I show how the legal framework has moved from
17

See Kjell-Åke Nordquist, Reconciliation as a Political Concept: Some Observations and
Remarks, in MULTIDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES ON PEACE AND CONFLICT RESEARCH: A
VIEW FROM EUROPE 197 (Francisco Ferrándiz & Antonius C.G.M. Robben eds., 2007)
(discussing observations of and reflections on reconciliation in connection with peace
processes and peace-building initiatives).
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ad hoc management to the signing of ECFA, formally institutionalizing
the idea of hybridity in the cross-strait economic regulation.
A. From Politics to Law: The Political Background and the
Legal Framework of the Cross-Strait Relations
The complicated relationship between Taiwan and China dates
back to the Chinese Civil War of 1945–49. When the Allies, including
China, defeated Japan to end World War II (WWII) in 1945, Taiwan was
part of Japan’s territory as a result of the 1895 Treaty of Shimonoseki
between Japan and the (Chinese) Qing Empire.18 As part of the Allies’
post-WWII transitional arrangement, the Allied Powers militarily
occupied Taiwan after Japan’s unconditional capitulation to the Allies.19
General Douglas MacArthur, the Supreme Commander for the Allied
Powers and the Commander in Chief of the United States Armed Forces in
the Far East, entrusted the occupation of Taiwan and Northern Vietnam to
Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek and his representatives. 20
Yet,
Generalissimo Chiang acted beyond his mandate, governing Taiwan as a
province of China before Taiwan’s legal status was settled.21 Following
the outbreak of the Chinese Civil War in 1945, China declared a state of
emergency in 1948, but did not impose martial law rule on Taiwan until
May 1949.22 Generalissimo Chiang’s Nationalist (or KMT) government
lost ground to the Communists in China both militarily and politically.23
18

Lung-Chu Chen & W.M. Reisman, Who Owns Taiwan: A Search for International Title,
81 YALE L.J. 599, 610–11 (1972).
19
Id., at 611–12, n.43.
20
Id. at n.43 (“The senior Japanese commanders and all ground, sea, air and auxiliary
forces within China excluding Manchuria, and Formosa and French Indo-China north of
sixteen degrees north latitude shall surrender to Generalissimo Chiang Kai[-]Shek[.]”).
21
For example, Generalissimo Chiang violated his mandate by imposing Chinese
nationality on Taiwanese inhabitants, who were still subjects of the Japanese Empire in
1945. Id., at 652 n.200. This unilateral act has been retrospectively recognized in the
Treaty of Peace between the Republic of China and Japan (Taipei Treaty), a peace treaty
between Chiang’s regime in Taipei and Japan in 1952. Treaty of Peace between the
Republic of China and Japan, China-Japan, art. X, Apr. 28, 1952, 138 U.N.T.S. 3. Since
the treaty does not include China, it is not clear whether it ended the state of war between
China and Japan under international law.
22
The state of emergency, i.e. the “state of mobilization,” was not declared according to
the constitutional provisions regarding the declaration of a state of emergency. Rather, the
Constitution was suspended to create unchecked emergency powers that were entrusted to
the president. To enlarge the presidential powers by shifting the executive power from the
prime minister to the president and bypassing the Constitution’s limited state of emergency,
Temporary Articles were enacted in accordance with the constitutional provisions
regarding constitutional revision on December 10, 1948, although they were separate from
the Constitution of 1946. Tay-Sheng Wang, The Legal Development of Taiwan in the 20th
Century: Toward a Liberal and Democratic Country, 11 PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y. J. 531, 541
(2002).
23
KMT stands for “Kuomintang,” also known as the Nationalist Party.
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However, Chiang ordered his loyalist troops and civilian followers to
regroup in Taiwan, despite his own ambiguous domestic and international
legal status.24
Before Generalissimo Chiang and his loyalists fled to Taiwan,
Chinese Communists had formed a new national government in Beijing
and proclaimed the creation of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) on
October 1, 1949.25 Even so, Generalissimo Chiang’s troops continued to
fight their Communist rivals in China as the newly established PRC
struggled to gain international recognition amid the global fear of the
expansion of communism.26 In the meantime, he moved the defeated
Nationalist government to Taiwan in December 1949, but continued using
the name the Republic of China (ROC). 27 Despite an unresolved
international law status, Taiwan has remained governed by the terms of
the 1946 ROC Constitution.28 Moreover, the ROC regime in Taiwan did
not forfeit its claim as the legitimate government of China and conducted
several failed commando raids along China’s southeast coast in the
1950s.29 In sum, as a consequence of the Civil War, Chinese warring
forces claimed that Taiwan was a part of China even though the rivaling
24

In terms of international law, Taiwan remained part of Japan but was under the
occupation of the Allied Powers. See Y. Frank Chiang, One-China Policy and Taiwan, 28
FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1, 20–22 (2004) (“In May 1951 . . . General MacArthur said,
‘Formosa is still a part of Japan[.]’”); see also Chen & Reisman, supra note 18, at 639–41
(“Chiang . . . acted as the trustee of the Allied Forces[.]”); cf. JAMES CRAWFORD, THE
CREATION OF STATES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 199 (2d ed. 2006) (“With the consent of the
Allied Powers, administration of Formosa was undertaken by the Government of the
Republic of China[.]”). But see Pasha L. Hsieh, An Unrecognized State in Foreign and
International Courts: The Case of the Republic of China on Taiwan, 28 MICH. J. INT’L L.
765, 769 (2007) (“After the Second World War, the Japanese retreated from Taiwan under
the terms of the Cairo Declaration, issued in 1943, which mandated that Taiwan ‘be
returned to the Republic of China.’”). In regard to the Republic of China’s (ROC)
domestic law, Chiang Kai-Shek announced his “retirement” and the “disclaimer” of
presidential powers to Vice President Li Tsung-Jen on January 21, 1949, while Li formally
succeeded to presidency on the same day. Thus, legally speaking, Generalissimo Chiang
and his loyal troops’ retreat to Taiwan without President Li’s authorization was effectively
a coup d’état. Moreover, President Li fled to the U.S. in 1949 in his capacity as Acting
President; the 1946 ROC regime collapsed in December 1949. Notably, several members
of the three houses of Parliament convened a “rump Parliament” in Taiwan, which laid the
ostensible legal ground for the post-1949 ROC regime. Robert E. Bedeski, Li Tsung-Jen
and the Demise of China’s “Third Force”, 5 ASIAN SURV. 616, 622–24 (1965).
25
MICHAEL BRECHER & JONATHAN WILKENFELD, A STUDY OF CRISIS 382 (1997).
26
R. Ovendale, Britain, the United States, and the Recognition of Communist China, 26
HIST. J. 139, 153 (2009).
27
Chiang, supra note 24, at 21.
28
The ROC Constitution was passed by the Constituent National Assembly in 1946 but did
not come into effect until December 25, 1947. Wen-Chen Chang, East Asian Foundations
for Constitutionalism: Three Models Reconstructed, 3 NAT’L TAIWAN U. L. REV. 111, 123
(2008).
29
NANCY BERNKOPF TUCKER, STRAIT TALK: UNITED STATES-TAIWAN RELATIONS AND THE
CRISIS WITH CHINA 15 (2009).

2011]

EXTRACONSTITUTIONAL HYBRID REGULATION

229

governing authorities in Taiwan and China regarded each other as rebels
to be forcefully suppressed.
In the 1980s, the international political standing of both the PRC
and the ROC changed.30 However, Taiwan and China’s perspectives on
their political rivalry did not change until Taiwan underwent
democratization in the 1980s. Dr. Lee Teng-Hui, a native Taiwanese,
succeeded to the presidency in 1988 after the death of Chiang Ching-Kuo,
Generalissimo Chiang’s elder son and anointed successor.31 During this
time, Taiwan was already under a gradual process of political reform,
which ultimately brought about fundamental changes to cross-strait
relations. 32 Acknowledging the end of Chiangs’ policy to reclaim
Nationalist rule in China through military means, President Lee declared
an end to the state of emergency in 1991.33 In addition, the bans on post,
communications, and travel across the Taiwan Strait were lifted as part of
Taiwan’s new conciliatory policy toward China.34 Correspondingly, the
ROC Constitution of 1946 was amended to reflect the new political reality.
Using the model of the pre-unification Basic Treaty of West Germany, the
jurisdiction of the ROC Constitution was confined to Taiwan and the

30

Generalissimo Chiang’s representative controlled China’s seat in the United Nations
until 1971 when the United States, Taiwan’s only major ally, failed to garner enough votes
in the General Assembly to support its stance under which the resolution of China’s
legitimate representation would require a two-thirds majority. Following the defeat in the
vote over the procedural question, Taiwan’s representative announced Taiwan’s
withdrawal from the U.N. before the General Assembly resolved to “expel forthwith the
representatives of Chiang Kai-Shek from the place which they unlawfully occupy at the
United Nations and in all the organizations related to it.” G.A. Res. 2758 (XXVI), U.N.
GAOR, 26th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/630, at 2 (Oct. 25, 1971). After Chiang’s government lost
its seat in the U.N., it faced a series of diplomatic defeats as well; now, only twenty-three
countries recognize the ROC regime as the legitimate representative of China and have
diplomatic relations. See Chiang, supra note 24, at 67–71 (“[T]he question of China's
representation in the General Assembly agenda was made each year from 1953 through
1960 by a member of the Soviet bloc. Each time the proposal was rejected.”).
31
Here, “Native Taiwanese” refers to persons whose forebears immigrated to Taiwan
before 1945, even though most, like immigrants who moved after 1945, were ethnically
Han Chinese. See Chen & Reisman, supra note 18, at 625–26 (“From the sixteenth
century onward, the Chinese population . . . created a new Taiwanese ethnic identity[.]”).
Generalissimo Chiang died in 1975, and the presidency passed to Vice President Yen
Chia-Kan, who was considered a caretaker president until Chiang Ching-Kuo was elected
in 1978. John F. Copper, Taiwan’s Failed President, 34 ASIAN AFF. 179, 189 (2008).
32
The martial law rule was lifted on July 15, 1987 but the state of emergency remained in
place until 1999 when the Temporary Articles of the Constitution were rescinded. Wang,
supra note 22, at 538–39.
33
Martial law was lifted in 1987 during Chiang Ching-Kuo’s presidency. Cheng-Yi Lin &
Wen-Cheng Lin, Democracy, Divided National Identity, and Taiwan’s National Security,
TAIWAN J. DEMOCRACY 69, 70 (2005).
34
The total ban on travel had been modified in 1987 to allow the veteran soldiers to visit
their families in China via third countries. Larry Yu, Travel between Politically Divided
China and Taiwan, 2 ASIA PAC. J. TOURISM RES. 19, 22–23 (1997).
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small islands under Taipei’s administration.35 As a result, Taiwan ceased
making political or legal claims on China. Rather, Taipei currently treats
Taiwan and Mainland China as two independent legal bodies, since a final
political settlement has not been reached.36
In contrast, China has not changed its stance toward Taiwan
despite the transformation of Taiwan’s political situation, but continues to
regard Taiwan as a renegade province.37 On the one hand, the PRC is
committed to bring Taiwan into the fold by military means if necessary.38
On the other hand, Beijing does not recognize the legitimacy of the
Nationalist government’s rule, whether it is extended to China or confined
to Taiwan.39 To avoid the impression of acquiescing to the legitimacy of
Taiwan’s governing authorities, the PRC continues to refuse direct contact
with Taiwan’s government, despite the fact that issues resulting from
civilian interactions have required increased cooperation from both sides
to reach practical resolutions.40
Since the early 1990s, both sides have understood the practical
need to tackle issues resulting from interactions across the Taiwan Strait.
Even though no formal contact has been established between the
governments of Taiwan and China, both sides have agreed on the socalled “white gloves” strategy.41 In 1991, two proxy organizations were
established as the only legal contact points: the SEF in Taiwan and the
ARATS in China.42 It is noteworthy that the SEF is a private legal body
established under the terms of Taiwan’s Civil Code even though most of

35

See generally Markus G. Puder, The Grass Will Not Be Trampled Because the Tigers
Need Not Fight—New Thoughts and Old Paradigms for Détente Across the Taiwan Strait,
34 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 481 (2001) (“Desist from representing each other or exerting
jurisdiction in the other’s territory[.]”). Notably, among these small islands, Kinmen
(Quemoy), Matsu, and their adjacent islets were not ceded to Japan in 1895. These islands
were part of the Chinese Province of Fujian but had been occupied by Generalissimo
Chiang’s troops as a consequence of Chinese Civil War. Chen & Reisman, supra note 18,
at 645.
36
Puder, supra note 35, at 510–16. This position seems to have shifted again since the
KMT was voted back to power in 2008. See infra note 51 and accompanying text.
37
Id. at 507.
38
Lin & Lin, supra note 33, at 74.
39
Puder, supra note 35, at 507.
40
Lin & Lin, supra note 33, at 83–84.
41
The prototype of the white gloves strategy can be traced to the Kinmen Agreement of
1990. To facilitate the deportation of Chinese illegal immigrants, an agreement was signed
in Kinmen by representatives of the Red Cross Committees from Taiwan and China.
Pasha L. Hsieh, The Taiwan Question and the One-China Policy: Legal Challenges with
Renewed Momentum, 84 DIE FRIEDENS-WARTE: J. INT’L PEACE & ORG. 59, 73 & n.47
(2009); see also Ko Shu-Ling, Ma Praises 1990 Kinmen Agreement, TAIPEI TIMES, Sept.
12, 2010, at 3 (discussing the Kinmen Agreement as well as President Ma Ying-Jeou’s
reaction to it).
42
Yu, supra note 34, at 24.
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its funding has come from the government budget.43 According to the
1992 Act Governing Relations between Peoples of the Taiwan Area and
the Mainland Area (hereinafter the 1992 Act), a special statute governing
the cross-strait relationship, “[the] Executive Yuan may set up or designate
an institution to handle the affairs relating to any dealings” across the
Taiwan Strait. 44 However, the SEF has been the only institution
designated to handle cross-strait relations, and it is subject to the
supervision and direction of the Mainland Affairs Council (MAC), a
ministerial collegiate body under the Executive Yuan.45 The scope of the
SEF’s mandate and its relations with the MAC are stipulated in
administrative contracts.46
However, after a bumpy start in 1993, the “white gloves” method
ground to a halt late in Lee’s presidency. As President Lee continued to
advocate that Taiwan was a separate political identity from China, the
PRC suspended all contact between the SEF and the ARATS in 1999.47
This suspension continued after 2000, when the pro-independence
Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) won the Taiwanese presidency.48
Nevertheless, China could not afford to maintain a no-contact policy,
since the political cold war did not chill interactions between Taiwanese
and Chinese civilians.49 To address practical issues resulting from these
interactions without abandoning the boycott of the DPP government,
sporadic negotiations and contacts were conducted between specially
designated private organizations in Taiwan and China, bypassing the SEF
and the ARATS. 50 These specially designated private organizations
handled cross-strait relations in the same manner as the SEF used to, but
on an ad hoc basis during the DPP administration.
China did not relent in its boycott until 2008, when the prounification KMT defeated the DPP in the presidential elections and
reverted to a platform of eventual unification from former President Lee’s
independence-oriented policy.51 Ever since, the direct contact between the
SEF and the ARATS has resumed and both organizations have reclaimed
43

Steven Goldstein, The Cross-Strait Talks of 1993—The Rest of the Story: Domestic
Politics and Taiwan’s Mainland Policy, in ACROSS THE TAIWAN STRAIT: MAINLAND CHINA,
TAIWAN AND THE 1995–96 CRISIS 197, 206 (Suisheng Zhao ed., 1999).
44
Taiwan Diqu yu Dalu Diqu Renmin Guanxi Tiaoli (臺灣地區與大陸地區人民關係條
例) [Act Governing Relations Between The People Of The Taiwan Area And The
Mainland Area], July 31, 1992, art. IV, para. 1, China-Taiwan [hereinafter 1992 Act] (the
1992 Act came into effect on Sept. 18, 1992).
45
1992 Act, art. IV, para. 2.
46
MAINLAND AFFAIRS COUNCIL, WORK SYSTEM OF MAINLAND POLICY (2012).
47
Hui-Wan Cho, China-Taiwan Tug of War in the WTO, 45 ASIAN SURV. 736, 742 (2005).
48
Id. at 743.
49
Id. at 747.
50
This is the so-called “Macau Model.” Jewel Huang, Now is the Time for Cross-Strait
Cooperation, Says MAC, TAIPEI TIMES, Jan. 17, 2007, at 3.
51
Editorial: Keep the President in President Ma, TAIPEI TIMES, Jul. 7, 2008, at 8.
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their position as the only bodies entrusted to negotiate on behalf of Taiwan
and China.52 Moreover, Taiwan’s government officials at the level of
deputy ministers have been seated at the negotiating table as part of the
delegation headed by the SEF, although they take off their official hats.
As a whole, hybridity is characteristic of the legal framework
underpinning Taiwan’s rapprochement with China. On the one hand,
negotiations have been represented by the SEF as well as other private
organizations. On the other hand, they have been subjected to the MAC’s
supervision, while government officials have begun to take part in the
negotiations despite wearing different hats. Thus, the SEF is a hybrid
body.
B. From Ad Hoc Management to Institutional Arrangement: the
Road to ECFA and the Institutionalization of the Idea of
Hybridity
Under the “white gloves” model, Taiwan and China have signed
over twenty single-issue agreements since 1990, most of which were
negotiated by the SEF and the ARATS.53 The driving force for continuing
contact between the two sides is the practical need to tackle issues arising
from the interactions between the peoples of Taiwan and China. For this
reason, even during the DPP administration from 2000 to 2008, an
agreement was signed between both sides to arrange charter flights for the
2005 Lunar New Year holidays.54 In that case, the SEF and the ARATS
were bypassed. Taiwan and China were instead represented by two
private organizations, the Taipei Airlines Association and the Civil
Aviation Association of China.55 Although it was a one-off agreement
that dealt with a technical, singular issue,56 it is of historical significance
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Dimitri Bruyas, SEF Cleared for Resuming Talks, THE CHINA POST, May 27, 2008.
These cross-agreements are signed under different names, such as “agreement,” “joint
agreement,” and “summary record.” According to the most recent statistics available on
the SEF website, there are twenty-eight cross-strait agreements as of October 20, 2011,
including those not negotiated or signed by SEF. STRAITS EXCHANGE FOUNDATION, LIANG
AN
XIEYI
[NEGOTIATED
AGREEMENTS]
(2012),
available
at
http://www.sef.org.tw/lp.asp?CtNode=3810&CtUnit=2083&BaseDSD=7&mp=19&nowPa
ge=1&pagesize=15. Notably, only twenty-four agreements are listed under the English
version of the same document.
STRAITS EXCHANGE FOUNDATION, NEGOTIATED
AGREEMENTS
(2012)
[hereinafter
SEF],
available
at
http://www.sef.org.tw/lp.asp?CtNode=4384&CtUnit=2569&BaseDSD=7&mp=300&nowP
age=1&pagesize=15.
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Philip P. Pan & Tim Culpan, China, Taiwan Agree to Direct Flights, WASH. POST, Jan.
16, 2005, at A21.
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Id.
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Joy Su, MAC Chilly to Chinese Flight Offer, TAIPEI TIMES, Feb. 26, 2005, at 1.
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because it paved the way for the first legal direct flight across the Strait
since 1949.57
As the 2005 agreement on charter flights indicates, practical needs
have prompted the two sides to negotiate regulatory issues as a
consequence of increasing cross-strait civilian interactions. However, the
parties employing this method of ad hoc management based on singleissue agreements, whether signed between the SEF and the ARATS or not,
have faced challenges when tackling the increasingly complicated myriad
of cross-strait issues. Of more than twenty agreements signed between
Taiwan and China, more than three quarters were negotiated and
concluded after the KMT was voted back to power in 2008. Most of these
agreements were negotiated individually to address specific matters,
including the deportation of criminals,58 cross-strait cooperation on food
safety,59 financial regulation, and a wide range of other regulatory areas.60
Considering Taiwan’s smaller population and territory relative to China,
the single-issue agreements in the aggregate have impacted Taiwanese
society. 61 In the meantime, as more and more single-issue oriented
agreements are needed to respond to the new issues resulting from the
accelerated interactions across the Taiwan Strait, the mode of ad hoc
management has been stretched to the limit.
This backdrop provided the impetus for the 2010 ECFA, one of
the latest agreements signed between Taiwan and China.62 At first glance,
ECFA is another single-issue agreement. It is expected to lay groundwork
for a future cross-strait common market. However, with the prospect of
economic integration between Taiwan and China, ECFA cannot be
confined to the pattern of ad hoc management, and instead requires special
note.63
As to its substance and purpose, ECFA is an interim agreement
under Article XXIV of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
57

Pan & Culpan, supra note 54.
SEF, CROSS-STRAIT JOINT CRIME-FIGHTING AND JUDICIAL MUTUAL ASSISTANCE
AGREEMENT (2009).
59
SEF, CROSS-STRAIT FOOD SAFETY AGREEMENT (2008).
60
SEF, CROSS-STRAIT FINANCIAL COOPERATION AGREEMENT (2009).
61
Mo Yan-Chih, Cross-Strait Talks Not Transparent: Panel, TAIPEI TIMES, May 16, 2010,
at 3.
62
A note of caution is needed here. As the heated debate prior to the signing of ECFA
revealed, political calculation played a significant role in the advocacy on behalf of ECFA.
According to this view, economic integration is expected to pave the way for an eventual
political union. See, e.g., Ted Yang, Economists Add Their Voices Against ECFA, TAIPEI
TIMES, Apr. 26, 2010, at 12. I shall limit my present analysis to the implications of ECFA
for transboundary governance. Together with ECFA, the Cross-Strait Agreement on
Intellectual Property Right Protection and Cooperation was signed on June 29, 2010. Later,
on December 21, 2010, the Cross-Strait Agreement on Medical and Health Cooperation
was signed. SEF, supra note 53.
63
Cindy Sui, Trade Deal Casts Shadow on Taiwan, ASIA TIMES, Aug. 5, 2010, available at
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/LH05Ad01.html.
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(GATT).64 Accordingly, ECFA aims to establish a cross-strait free trade
zone, which would lead to the economic integration of Taiwan and
China.65 Although ECFA was negotiated and signed under the terms of
the World Trade Organization (WTO), it both reflects and deviates from
the pattern in which previous agreements between Taiwan and China were
concluded.66 On the one hand, despite having WTO law as the underlying
legal framework, the signatories of ECFA are not the two equal members
of the WTO, i.e., “the Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu,
Kinmen . . . Matsu” and the PRC.67 Rather, paralleling previous crossstrait agreements, it is signed between the SEF and the ARATS with no
reference to the principal entities they represent. Juxtaposed with trade
agreements signed between Taiwan and other countries that do not
recognize its statehood, this deliberate obscuring of the principals
represented by the SEF and the ARATS in ECFA is remarkable.68 The
Bilateral Investment Promotion and Protection Agreement (BIPA)
between Taiwan and India, which was signed by the Taipei Economic and
Cultural Center in New Delhi and the India Association in Taipei,
provides an example. The agreement’s text suggests that the two
contracting parties are merely the representatives of “the authorities of the

64

Pasha L. Hsieh, The China-Taiwan ECFA, Geopolitical Dimensions and WTO Law, 14 J.
INT’L ECON. L. 121, 140 (2011). GATT was the predecessor of the World Trade
Organization (WTO), which was established in 1995. See Cho, supra note 47, at 739–41
(discussing how China has attempted to prevent Taiwan from joining the GATT).
65
Hsieh, supra note 64, at 147.
66
The WTO is the only international organization in which both Taiwan and China
participate as equal members: “Any state or separate customs territory possessing full
autonomy in the conduct of its external commercial relations and of the other matters
provided for in the Agreement and the Multilateral Trade Agreements may accede to this
Agreement.” Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization art. XII,
Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 154 (emphasis added). Notably, Taiwan joined the WTO as
a separate customs territory on January 1, 2002, assuming the name of the Separate
Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu, while China’s WTO
membership, which came into effect on November 10, 2001, is based on its statehood.
Hsieh, supra note 64, at 123–24. The impact of ECFA on the overarching WTO regime in
governing the cross-strait relationship will be addressed later.
67
Cho, supra note 47, at 737.
68
Notably, most of the countries in the world do not recognize the statehood of Taiwan
and thus engage in no direct official contact with the Taiwanese government. For example,
since the U.S. established diplomatic relations with the PRC in 1979, the U.S. has only
maintained representation in Taipei; the representative body is called the American
Institute in Taiwan (AIT). Reciprocally, Taiwan’s representation in Washington, D.C. is
called Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office in the United States (TECRO).
In terms of consular functions, both are equal to embassies. Agreements between Taiwan
and the U.S. also follow this path. The U.S. is referred to as “the Territory of the
Authorities Represented by AIT,” while Taiwan is referred to as “the Territory of the
Authorities Represented by TECRO.” See, e.g., Chen I-Chung, Beef Controversy a
Political Issue, TAIPEI TIMES, Mar. 14, 2012, at 8.
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respective territories” where they exercise jurisdiction.69 Thus, the Taipei
Economic and Cultural Center in New Delhi and the India Association in
Taipei are the representatives, while Taiwan and India, the authorities of
territories they represent respectively, are the principals.
In contrast, reading the ECFA text in entirety does not illuminate
whether it is an agreement signed between two principals of public
authorities through their authorized representatives, or one between two
private organizations, the SEF and the ARATS. Rather, the text was
drafted to give the impression that the ECFA would be a private contract
between the SEF and the ARATS. For example, Article 5, Paragraph 2 of
the text provides for “gradually reducing restrictions on mutual
investments between the two Parties,” rather than the territories or
authorities represented by the SEF and the ARATS, respectively, as
formulated in the BIPA between Taiwan and India.70 Even if the ECFA
notification had been sent to the WTO Secretariat on May 6, 2011,
according to Article XXIV of GATT, third parties cannot tell of the
existence of an interim agreement between the two WTO members by
browsing the list of regional trade agreements filed with the WTO.71
On the other hand, deviating from the ad hoc management mode,
ECFA has suggested a move towards formal establishment of a crossstrait governance regime. Article 11 provides, “[t]he two Parties [i.e., SEF
and ARATS] shall establish a Cross-Straits [sic] Economic Cooperation
Committee . . . which consists of representatives designated by the two
Parties.”72 The CSECC has a potentially wide-ranging competence. It
will be in charge of “handling matters relating to [ECFA],” which is
defined as “including but not limited to” the following matters:
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Agreement between the India Taipei Association in Taipei and the Taipei Economic and
Cultural Center in New Delhi on the Promotion and Protection of Investments, IndiaTaiwan,
art.
1,
para.
4,
Nov.
28,
2002,
available
at
http://www.finmin.nic.in/bipa/Taiwan.pdf.
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Id. at art. 5, para. 2.
71
Staff Writer, WTO Notified of ECFA, TAIPEI TIMES, May 7, 2011, at 11. The ECFA is
currently listed as “The Cross-Straits Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement
(ECFA)” among early announcements in relation to regional trade agreements (RTAs).
WTO,
LIST
OF
ALL
EARLY
ANNOUNCEMENTS
MADE
TO
WTO,
http://rtais.wto.org/UI/PublicEARTAList.aspx. Unlike other early announcements or
RTAs in force, this is the only agreement whose title falls short of indicating its (possible)
signatories, as the term “Cross-Strait” does not signify the relations across the Taiwan
Strait at all. Rather, when visitors click the link under “The Cross-Straits Economic
Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA),” further information of the signatories is
provided. An annotation—“The Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits
(China); The Straits Exchange Foundation (the Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan,
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WTO, THE CROSS-STRAITS ECONOMIC COOPERATION FRAMEWORK AGREEMENT (ECFA)
(2010).
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ECFA art. 11, para. 1 (1)–(5).
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(1) concluding consultations necessary for the attainment
of the objectives of this Agreement; (2) monitoring and
evaluating the implementation of this Agreement; (3)
interpreting the provisions of [ECFA]; (4) notifying
important economic and trade information; (5) settling
any dispute over the interpretation, implementation and
application of [ECFA] in accordance with Article 10.73

Although Article 10 stipulates that “appropriate dispute settlement
procedures” should be established through subsequent consultations
between the SEF and the ARATS, the CSECC will be the institution
where disputes arising from ECFA are to be settled before the formal
dispute settlement mechanism comes into force. Many agreements signed
between the SEF and the ARATS have also included the consultation
clause. However, without an institutional arrangement, those clauses are
of little practical significance, and only express the good will of both sides.
In contrast, the CSECC establishes a formal institution in which further
consultations and future negotiations can be conducted. Unlike other
single-issue cross-strait agreements negotiated and concluded on an ad
hoc basis, it is provided that the CSECC meets regularly every six months
in addition to ad hoc meetings convened when necessary.74 Due to the
wide range of issues covered by ECFA, the CSECC is predicted to evolve
into an institutional platform with comprehensive competence.75
Moreover, the CSECC will not only operate as an institutional
forum, but will also function as a cross-strait governance body. As the
main implementing agency of ECFA, the CSECC is expected to grow into
a functional equivalent of a transnational administration in charge of
cross-strait regulatory affairs.76 In addition, it will exercise regulatory
powers as well as authorities of (quasi-)judicial nature in interpreting
ECFA and settling related disputes.77 Even so, the CSECC will not result
in an established administrative or judicial body comprising permanent
staff, but rather an institutional framework with administrative and judicial
functions.78 As its initial formation in January 2011 suggests, the number
of CSECC members is not fixed, while the members, all of whom are
sitting government officials from both sides except the heads of both the

73
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The convening of the CSECC ad hoc meetings requires the consent of the SEF and the
ARATS. ECFA art. 11, para. 3.
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SEF and the ARATS delegations, are appointed on an ad hoc basis.79 In
addition, different ad hoc “working groups” are being set up to “handle
matters in specific areas pertaining to [ECFA].”80 Thus, in terms of
organization and personnel composition, the CSECC shows features of
high flexibility and fluidity.
Taken together, the rapprochement between Taiwan and China
has moved from the mode of ad hoc management to some form of
institutional arrangement, culminating in the signing of the ECFA. Still,
as establishment of the CSECC suggests, the institutional arrangement in
relation to governance of cross-strait issues is incomplete. Rather, it
maintains characteristics of flexibility that have taken shape during the
political thaw between Taiwan and China in the early 1990s. Through its
malleable organizational form and flexible personnel composition, the
CSECC epitomizes the institutionalization of the idea of hybridity, which
is characteristic of the legal framework underpinning Taiwan’s
relationship with China.

III. PUBLICNESS IN TATTERS: THE WITHERING OF DEMOCRATIC
LEGITIMACY IN TRANSNATIONAL HYBRID ADMINISTRATION
As epitomized in the establishment of the CSECC under the
ECFA framework, hybridity is the underlying feature of Taiwan’s legal
framework governing cross-strait affairs. While the ambiguous legal
nature of hybridity as an institutional arrangement in administrative law
raises eyebrows, the CSECC will have little impact on regulatory
governance if it is simply adopted to satisfy two opposing sides’ concerns
over diplomatic protocols.81 However, as its competence covers a wide
range of issues across the Taiwan Strait, the CSECC evokes transnational
hybrid administration. From this perspective, as the idea of publicness is
obscured in hybridity, the question of lacking democratic legitimacy, of
which transnational hybrid administration has long been accused, worsens
with respect to the CSECC.82 To shed light on the issue of democratic
legitimacy of the CSECC, I take up this issue in light of the idea of
publicness, which underlies public authorities. First, I discuss how the
idea of publicness is institutionalized in the constitutional state and,
alternatively, in the functioning of global administrative law beyond the
state: neither provides promising hope for transposing the idea of
publicness to transnational hybrid administration. Taking a close look at
the CSECC, I then suggest that global administrative law, as an alternative
79

Ko Shu-Ling, Taipei, Beijing Set Up Trade Committee, TAIPEI TIMES, Jan. 7, 2011 at 1.
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Barak-Erez, supra note 2, at 500–09; see also KOPPELL, supra note 3, at 1–3 (discussing
the benefits and proliferation of hybrids).
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institutionalization of the idea of publicness, is limited in controlling
transnational hybrid administration when non-publicness becomes an end
in itself.
A. Taming Transnational Hybridity: in Quest of the Idea
of Publicness
The rise of the state as the epitome of the modern political form
has been ascribed to the rediscovery of the idea of publicness at the
waning of the Middle Ages.83 The idea of publicness suggests the rise of
political autonomy in modern politics as opposed to the blurring of public
and private spheres in the premodern era. 84 Moreover, it makes the
concept of the constitutional state possible. Through the idea of
publicness, the constitutional state remains sovereign because public
opinion is channeled through mechanisms of political representation and
lends legitimacy to political power held by state organs.85 On the other
hand, the political power centralized by the state is not unlimited but
instead attached to the public through the constitutional system. In this
way, the constitutional system, which is mainly concerned with the control
of political power through separation of powers and the protection of
fundamental rights, embodies the idea of publicness. The idea of
publicness provides the key to understanding the challenges that
transnational hybrid administration poses to constitutional democracy.86
In this section, I first discuss the close relation between publicness
and the constitutional state. In terms of the organization of power, which
is the underlying theme of transnational hybrid administration, the idea of
publicness is embodied in the principles and rules regarding the control of
political power in constitutional and administrative law. In this way,
constitutional and administrative law links state sovereignty to the idea of
publicness, legitimizing the exercise of the sovereign power in the
constitutional state.
Yet, as the new configuration of power in
transnational hybrid administration undermines the traditional
mechanisms in constitutional and administrative law that ensure the
legality and legitimacy of the exercise of political power, the idea of
publicness in the constitutional state is thus jeopardized.
The
displacement of the idea of publicness from the constitutional state
83

HABERMAS, STRUCTURAL TRANSFORMATION OF THE PUBLIC SPHERE, supra note 8, at 5–
26; see also MARTIN LOUGHLIN, FOUNDATIONS OF PUBLIC LAW 17–88 (2010) (discussing
the medieval origins of Public Law and its subsequent development).
84
LOUGHLIN, supra note 83, at 228; see also Novak, supra note 3, at 27–28 (discussing the
roots of American public-private governance).
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LOUGHLIN, supra note 83, at 229–31; see also HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS,
supra note 8, at 168–93.
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constitutes the central concern over the rise of transnational hybrid
administration.
If constitutional and administrative law offer little assurance to the
concern over transnational hybrid administration, we must adopt new
approaches to bring back the idea of publicness.87 Global administrative
law is argued to provide the source of legitimacy not confined to the
sovereign state by virtue of the idea of publicness.88 Upon conducting
close inspection, I indicate in the second part of this section that global
administrative law’s capability of taming the beast of transnational hybrid
administration is not unconditional.
1. Displacing Publicness from the Constitutional State: the
Question of Transnational Hybrid Administration
The idea of publicness lends legitimacy to the political power of
the constitutional state by virtue of the constitutional separation of
powers.89 Separation of powers is designed to ensure that no single state
organ holds sway in the exercise of state power. Rather, decisions
resulting from the complex and sometimes cumbersome political
processes, involving distinct constitutional branches of power mediated by
electoral processes, are regarded as willed by the public.90
However, separation of powers is ineffective in terms of
transnational hybrid administration. The area of foreign affairs has
exemplified how the constitutional separation of powers is limited. On the
other hand, considering the political nature of foreign affairs, the judiciary
traditionally takes a back seat and lets the political branches, the executive
and the legislative, take charge. 91 It is true that with the traditional
legislative oversight through legislation and appropriation as well as
appointment, checks and balances can be maintained between the
87

See, e.g., Christian Joerges, A New Type of Conflicts Law as the Legal Paradigm of the
Postnational Constellation, in KARL POLANYI, GLOBALISATION AND THE POTENTIAL OF
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(2008) (analyzing the rise of publicness in international law).
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executive and the legislative with respect to foreign affairs. 92
Nevertheless, developments since WWII have rendered legislative
oversight of the executive’s power over foreign affairs ineffective.
As more powers are delegated to international organizations, the
legislative power enshrined in constitutions is curtailed. For example,
with the United Nations Security Council resolution in hand, President
George H.W. Bush could deploy armed forces in the first Persian Gulf
War without prior Congressional authorization.93 In addition to political
decisions, more regulatory matters require cooperation between
administrative agencies and their myriad international or regional
counterparts.
Regulation and administration have become
transnationalized.94 Take the WTO for example: despite the so-called
American exceptionalism in regard to international law and
organizations,95 the U.S. was the principal advocate for the WTO as the
institutional mechanism that would facilitate free trade.96 Yet, with the
WTO’s enhanced role in regulating international trade independent of
national control, concerns have been raised over the dilution of U.S.
sovereignty.97 Moreover, as administrative agencies take on transnational
characteristics, the state is considered “disaggregated” and regulatory
power decentralized,98 making the legislative oversight of administration
more difficult.99
If the globalizing regulatory environment undermines
constitutional design regarding the legislative oversight of
administration,100 administrative law may be turned to in order to restore
92
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the idea of publicness in transnational hybrid administration. 101 Yet,
traditional administrative law has limitations in transnational hybrid
administration.
In the eye of traditional administrative law, hybrid/private
administration has been regarded as the exception. 102 The classical
approaches to alleviating the uneasiness of private/hybrid administration
are either to trace decisions to the public agency that devolve the mandate
of public authorities thereto, or to regard the administration as the
extension of the devolving public agency.103 In the first approach, the
devolving public agency, together with its staff of government officials,
can be held accountable for the decisions made by hybrid/private
administration.104 Under the second approach, the decisions of the agent
private/hybrid administration can be scrutinized in light of administrative
law.105
To be sure, classical approaches do not succeed in bringing
hybrid/private administration in line with administrative law. On the one
hand, holding the devolving public agency accountable for what
hybrid/private administration does is ineffective at ensuring that the
requirements of administrative law be observed. Hybrid/private bodies
tasked with public regulation are kept from the direct legal liability
incurred from their decisions; rather, they are only liable to the devolving
agencies.106 Considering the package devolution of regulatory decisions,
devolving public agencies tend to find it difficult to react to the
misconduct or even unlawful decisions of hybrid/private administration.107
been weakened in regard to transnational administration, while the appearance of
transnational hybrid administration only worsens this trend).
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PERSPECTIVE 102–03 (2007) (discussing legal accountability as a benefit of delegation).
104
Richard Mulgan, Government Accountability For Outsourced Services, 65 AUSTL. J.
PUB. ADMIN. 48, 48 (2006).
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to the government[.]”).
106
Auby, supra note 2, at 520.
107
KOPPELL, supra note 3, at 43–45.

242

U. OF PENNSYLVANIA EAST ASIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 7

Reacting aggressively by imposing heavy legal penalties on the entrusted
regulatory bodies does harm to the relationship between the devolving
public agency and the entrusted agent organizations, casting a shadow on
the future regulatory decisions of hybrid/private administration. In
addition, as the relationship of devolution becomes more complicated, it is
more difficult to identify a single devolving public agency. Under such
circumstances, it is hard to know which public agency should be held
accountable.108
On the other hand, applying administrative law directly to
hybrid/private administration appears to be a more enticing choice but it
turns out to be of little help. First, private bodies tasked with public
regulation are diverse. 109 Some are established to implement public
regulatory policies.110 The SEF in Taiwan is an example of this type of
private body. In contrast, other private bodies tasked with public
regulation still conduct private business that has no bearing on public
policy.111 In such situations, it is challenging to apply administrative law
to private bodies in a way that aligns with their public functions.112 In
addition, there is no agreement as to which part of administrative law
should apply.113 Will the decision made by hybrid/private administration
be subject to the internal review of administrative justice? If so, will the
hybrid/private administration establish its own internal review
mechanism? Will there be any qualification requirements for the internal
reviewers? Is the decision made by hybrid/private administration
justiciable? Will the notice and comment requirement in administrative
procedures apply to hybrid/private administration? Administrative law
itself fails to provide clear answers to these complicated questions.114
In sum, by combining transnational and hybrid elements,
transnational hybrid administration defies the institutional mechanisms as
to the control of administration provided in the constitutional structure and
traditional administrative law. Transnational hybrid administration calls
the idea of publicness in the constitutional state into question.
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2. Discovering Publicness beyond the State: is Global
Administrative Law the Answer to Transnational Hybrid
Administration?
Even if there is a constellation of legal issues surrounding
hybrid/private administration, the employment of hybrid/private
administration in global governance seems to be inevitable,115 covering a
wide range of issues such as banking regulation,116 governance of the
Internet,117 the establishment of international standards,118 and so on.
It is not hard to see why hybrid/private administration has become
popular with global governance. The needs for global governance result
from the drive of globalization, going beyond the institutional framework
designed by sovereign states. Take the prime example of the International
Organization for Standardization (ISO). Tracing its origin far back to the
1920s,119 the ISO has taken on the role of a global governance actor, as its
standards have continuously exerted influence on nearly every aspect of
daily life. With its standards adopted by other international organizations,
the ISO’s de facto governance role is further strengthened.120 On the other
hand, as global governance issues have become more diverse and more
complex, their regulation and resolution require not only innovative
measures but also new forms of institutional arrangement. 121 Thus
emerges hybrid/private administration, defying the traditional
organizational forms of public administration.
Facing the increasing importance of hybrid/private administration
in global governance, attempts have been made to reconstruct the idea of
publicness beyond the state. As suggested in the preceding section, the
idea of publicness is entwined with the state in which all political powers
are centered. The idea of publicness is embedded in constitutional and
administrative law, which is traditionally state-centered, aiming at the
115
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legitimacy of the state power.122 While this state-oriented construction of
publicness is strained in the globalizing world, a close look at the
formation of the idea of publicness in the constitutional state suggests an
alternative conception of publicness.
The emphasis on legislative oversight in the constitutional
separation of powers and the focus on the relationship between devolving
agencies and entrusted organizations in administrative law reveal that the
institutional construction of the idea of publicness in the constitutional
state is centered on the “source” of power.123 Both indicate that the
legitimacy of the power exercised by transnational hybrid administration
must be traced to the state through the principles and rules of
constitutional and administrative law. However, this only tells half the
story of the idea of publicness. In the constitutional state, the state power
results from the political processes through which public opinion
underpins decisions made by state organs. 124 Elections, referendums,
public debate over public policies, and other channels of citizen
participation in the decision-making process are elements of the political
process through which political power finds its legitimacy. 125 Taken
together, the idea of publicness is organized around both the source of
state power and the political processes in relation to it. If the stateoriented idea of publicness falls short on the side of the source of power,
the solution to the strained idea of publicness may be found on the side of
political process. Here is where global administrative law comes in.
As widely discussed in literature, global administrative law aims
to bring global governance into line with the ideals of rule of law by
remodeling transnational regulatory regimes with the aid of administrative
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law tools.126 Moreover, as global governance has grown more complex,
the traditional conception of legitimacy of transnational regulation
centered on the parliamentary approval of treaties is stretched to the
limit.127 The transmission belt model of legitimacy, which focuses on the
source of the power exercised by transnational hybrid administration, does
not hold up.128 A new conception of legitimacy focused on political
processes arises. Moreover, as the story of globalization tells, this new
conception of legitimacy looks beyond the confines of the state. As a
global political community is not within sight and national parliaments do
not provide enough checks and balances,129 political processes that are
considered essential to the legitimacy of transnational hybrid
administration focus on non-electoral channels and extend them onto the
globalizing regulatory environment.130 Thus, administrative law values
such as due process, transparency, accountability, and reasonable
decision-making are read into hybrid/private administration in global
governance. For this reason, global administrative law is distinct from the
classical approaches to reining in hybrid/private administration by
improvising the doctrinal tools of traditional administrative law. In other
words, drawing inspiration from the idea of publicness, global
administrative law is not argued to break free of the will of nation-states,
but is rather embedded in the practices of global governance.131
126
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Specifically, the practices of hybrid/private administration in
transnational regulation are reconstructed in light of the idea of publicness,
at the core of which is “the claim made for law that it has been wrought by
the whole society, by the public, and the connected claim that law
addresses matters of concern to the society as such.”132 In this way, the
relationship between administrative law and the practices of hybrid/private
administration in transnational regulation is no longer centered on whether
and how to apply the former to the latter. Rather, “legality” is identified
in the practice of transnational hybrid/private administration.133 For it to
have legal character beyond a code of conduct, it must be accepted by the
stakeholders in transnational regulation “as wrought by the whole
society.”134
However, such a claim pivots on whether the practices of
transnational hybrid administration come out of the processes in which the
public, or, rather, stakeholders can take part and influence their
substance.135 These processes include the participation of stakeholders
through notice and comment or hearing procedures bolstered by the
requirements of reason-giving and transparency.
Through these
administrative law mechanisms, the alternative routes tied to the practices
of transnational hybrid administration redirect public opinion from the
political processes that are aimed at preserving the state-centered source of
political power. 136 As a result, those practices of transnational
hybrid/private administration underpinned by these processes constitute
part of global administrative law, functioning as the normative model for
future transnational hybrid/private administration. In addition, the
exercise of regulatory power by hybrid administrations gains legitimacy.
In this way, transnational hybrid/private administration is no longer a
moving target of traditional administrative law, but rather an innovative
institutional arrangement with normative values in global governance.137
Global administrative law appears to resolve issues surrounding
hybrid/private administration left unanswered in the state-oriented
constitutional system and traditional administrative law.
From this perspective, global administrative law works to rein in
transnational hybrid/private administration, but not without limitation.
While transnational hybrid/private administration arises to tackle the
pragmatic needs of transboundary regulation, its hybrid or private
132
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character is simply functional.138 It fills in the regulatory vacuum where
states, international organizations, or public administrative bodies have
failed.139 It goes to great lengths to develop practices that will be accepted
as “[having] been wrought by the whole society, by the public, and the
connected claim that [they] address[] matters of concern to the society as
such” just like the regulations, rules, and laws made by public
administrative bodies. 140 For this reason, transnational hybrid/private
administration remains a functional equivalent to public administration.141
In this regard, it echoes the classical approaches to hybrid/private
administration in traditional administrative law: either tracing back to the
devolving public agency or regarding hybrid/private administration as the
extension of public administration.
Here is where traditional
administrative law approaches and global administrative law converge in
regard to hybrid/private administration.
It is the ties between hybrid/private regulation and public
administration that have made the functioning of hybrid/private
administration compatible with the values clustered around the idea of
publicness.142 Only by means of these ties can the alternative political
processes work alongside the political processes conceived in the
constitutional system. Taken together, the political processes in and
beyond the state compensate for the shortcomings of constitutional and
administrative law that focuses on the source of political power. The idea
of publicness is thus restored in transnational hybrid administration.
Cutting the ties between hybrid/private regulation and public authorities
would forestall the effort to restore the idea of publicness in transnational
hybrid administration through global administrative law. This is the
condition for global administrative law to function properly with respect
to transnational hybrid/private administration.
B. When Non-Publicness Becomes an End in Itself: Double
Jeopardy for Publicness in the Hybrid Cross-Strait Economic
Regulation
I have argued in the preceding section that the function of global
administrative law in keeping private/hybrid administration from running
amok at the cost of public interest is conditioned by the compatibility of
private/hybrid administration and the values associated with the idea of
publicness. In other words, for global administrative law to restore the
138
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idea of publicness displaced from the constitution, the hybrid or private
character of hybrid/private administration cannot be an end in itself but
must be only a means driven by functional expediency. If hybrid/private
administration were deliberately designed to stand apart from the
authorities of public administration, the invocation of the idea of
publicness would be futile in breathing new life to the democratic
legitimacy of transnational hybrid administration.
Under such
circumstances, the idea of publicness is faced with the double jeopardy of
being displaced from the constitutional state and emptied of meaning in
the functioning of global administrative law beyond the state. A close
inspection of the legal framework and institutional arrangement
concerning cross-strait governance issues in Taiwan reveals this double
jeopardy that threatens the idea of publicness in the hybrid economic
regulation across the Taiwan Strait. Before going to the hybrid cross-strait
economic regulation in Taiwan, it helps to look into why the idea of
publicness fails to enhance the democratic legitimacy of transnational
hybrid administration if hybrid/private administration is deliberately
severed from the authorities of public administration.
Suppose that the element of hybridity or privateness is added
mainly to conceal the public character of states, international
organizations, and other administrative bodies.
This kind of
hybrid/private administration, which I call ultra hybrid regulation, is in
effect designed to elude “the claim made for law that it has been wrought
by the whole society, by the public, and the connected claim that law
addresses matters of concern to the society as such.”143 If so, it would
contradict the raison d’être of ultra hybrid regulation to reattribute the
displaced normative values of publicness to the practices resulting from
hybrid/private administration. It may be argued that this case is virtually
inconceivable given that hybrid/private administration is either created by
public administrative bodies to extend the reach of public administration
in a more expedient organizational form or emerges of itself to
complement public administration in resolving regulatory issues. Yet, a
closer inspection of the legal framework and institutional arrangement
concerning the cross-strait governance issues in Taiwan indicates
otherwise.
In terms of the cross-strait governance concerning Taiwan, there
is not much that the constitution can do to address the issue of democratic
legitimacy, as the SEF is not considered part of the government. Formally
speaking, all agreements between Taiwan and China are subject to
parliamentary oversight, even if the signatory on Taiwan’s behalf is the
SEF.144 However, the effectiveness of parliamentary oversight as to the
cross-strait relations is questionable. According to Article 5 of the 1992
143
144
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Act, the agreements between Taiwan and China are divided into two
types.145 The first type refers to those agreements the implementation of
which will require existing laws being amended or new legislation being
made. With respect to this type of agreement, the Legislative Yuan,
which is Taiwan’s parliament, has to decide whether to assent to the
signed agreement within thirty days. Unlike the parliamentary oversight
of other international treaties or executive agreements, however, the
inaction of the Legislative Yuan as to the agreement under consideration
within thirty days will be construed as parliamentary approval.146 To
make matters worse, if the parliamentary debate on the agreement under
consideration carries on beyond the limit of thirty days, the agreement will
come into effect automatically. In other words, to reject a cross-strait
agreement, the Legislative Yuan must complete the debate and vote on it
within thirty days. Suppose that Legislators (members of the Legislative
Yuan) have expressed strong opposition to the agreement under
consideration in the parliamentary debate but failed to conclude the debate
within thirty days. According to the 1992 Act, the failure to vote in a
prolonged parliamentary debate amounts to an act of tacit consent!
The second type of agreement under Article 5 of the 1992 Act is
of those whose implementation requires neither existing laws being
amended nor new legislation being made. The role of the Legislative
Yuan in controlling this type of agreement is merely nominal in that the
agreements are only to be filed for record with the Legislative Yuan.147
No parliamentary vote is even needed. Taken together, these imply that
the Legislative Yuan is straightjacketed with respect to parliamentary
oversight of the agreements between Taiwan and China.
If the constitution provides no solution to the displacement of
publicness, global administrative law may come into play in ensuring that
the cross-strait agreements are in accordance with the rule of law and
other constitutional principles. In this regard, the executive oversight of
the SEF and other entrusted organizations is important.148 However, as
the experience with the classical approaches to hybrid/private
administration in traditional administrative law suggests, the oversight
from the MAC is limited too. Either the MAC changes the SEF board of
directors through the government share in the foundation or the MAC
145
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exercises its oversight in accordance with its administrative contract with
the SEF and other entrusted organizations.149 Considering the diversity of
cross-strait issues, however, it is unlikely that administrative contracts can
be well drafted in advance to address all situations.
What makes matters worse is the signing of the ECFA and the
establishment of the CSECC. First, as the ECFA covers a wide range of
subject matters, the executive oversight of the SEF is stretched thin.
Moreover, as the CSECC is gradually evolving into a transboundary
governance body, the already limited parliamentary oversight will be
further curtailed. According to the 1992 Act, the SEF and other private
organizations entrusted to negotiate with their Chinese counterparts may
even further devolve their function to other organizations.150 However,
the CSECC is not an incorporated organization under Taiwan’s legal
system but instead a creation of the ECFA itself. Thus, it is dubious
whether the CSECC can legally act as the secondary agent organization of
the SEF in the eye of the 1992 Act if the CSECC is to be understood in the
framework of the 1992 Act.
On the other hand, it may be argued that the oversight of the
CSECC should be considered under the framework of the ECFA instead
of the 1992 Act because the CSECC is a new creation of the ECFA.
According to this view, as the ECFA has been approved by the Legislative
Yuan, the legal basis of the CSECC as a transnational regulatory body
appears to be unquestionable. Yet, considering the textual parsimony of
the ECFA, it is inconceivable for a national parliament to devolve tasks
and functions of such importance to the CSECC carte blanche.151 Notably,
under the terms of the 1992 Act, parliamentary oversight of cross-strait
affairs is limited to the approval of the first type of agreement noted above.
Thus, as the regulatory and governance function of the CSECC is
expected to grow without more agreements to be signed between the SEF
and the ARATS, the Legislative Yuan will be further pushed away from
overseeing cross-strait affairs.
Moreover, with the CSECC staying beyond the reach of the
Legislative Yuan, government officials may well be induced to take
advantage of the uncontrolled cross-strait institutional arrangement as the
main decision-making body with regard to economic affairs and thus
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bypass regular parliamentary oversight in this regard.152 As noted above,
government officials at the level of deputy minister have taken part in the
CSECC. According to Article 11 of ECFA, they are appointed by the SEF
on the side of Taiwan. Ironically, Taiwan’s members of the CSECC
appointed by the SEF have included officials from the MAC, which is the
ministerial collegiate body responsible for overseeing the SEF. 153
Consequently, the executive oversight of the SEF by the MAC has been
rendered toothless. To sum up, as Taiwan’s administration of cross-strait
relations moves toward ultra hybrid regulation, traditional oversight by
parliament and the executive branch has been left in shambles.
In such a situation, global administrative law may contribute to
reining in the ultra hybrid regulation in another way. If neither legislative
control nor executive oversight is feasible, the CSECC may still be
brought into compliance with rule of law values through administrative
law tools that implement the idea of publicness. This will place the
CSECC among other hybrid/private administrations in global
governance.154 Specifically, the CSECC may enact its own guidelines
governing the procedures under which its decisions and interpretations of
ECFA will be made. 155 Also, it may self-impose transparency
requirements on prospective consultations pertaining to the attainment of
the ECFA objectives.156 Moreover, the CSECC, which is entrusted with
the settlement of disputes in relation to ECFA before the establishment of
a formal dispute settlement mechanism, may bring in judicial or quasijudicial mechanisms to guarantee impartiality and fairness in dispute
settlement. 157 In this way, global administrative law may compensate for
the oversight deficit arising from the hybridity embedded in the
CSECC.158
Yet, a closer look at the ultra hybrid regulation of cross-strait
affairs in general and the CSECC in particular suggests that global
152
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administrative law will not help much in this regard. As noted above, if
hybrid/private administration is invoked in response to the practical needs
of transboundary regulation, administrative law tools may be instituted to
give legitimacy and rationality to the operation of hybrid/private
administration, making it compatible with the idea of publicness. On the
contrary, the ultra hybrid regulation of cross-strait affairs was not created
to fill in the regulatory vacuum where public administrative bodies failed,
but to bypass public authorities. 159 Based on its hardline stance of
rejecting Taiwan as an equal and sovereign polity, China has refused any
direct contact with Taiwan’s national government; moreover, any
indication of sovereign authorities has also been rejected. 160 As a
consequence, two proxy organizations have had to be established as
private-law bodies; all cross-strait agreements have had to be negotiated
and signed as private contracts between these two window organizations;
cross-strait agreements are treated differently from international treaties
and are only subject to limited parliamentary oversight in Taiwan; and the
CSECC cannot be integrated as part of the government, which would
otherwise subject it to constitutional checks and balances.
If the hybrid institutional arrangement regarding governance
issues across the Taiwan Strait is designed to be uncolored by public
authorities, there is little hope that the CSECC will follow other examples
of hybrid/private administration in global governance to introduce
administrative law control.161 Supposing the CSECC remodeled itself on
the idea of publicness, the CSECC’s administrative law mechanisms
would still not automatically be regarded as sufficient. Rather, the
CSECC would have to open itself to scrutiny of the values emanating
from the same idea of publicness.162 Specifically, the CSECC’s would-be
self-imposed administrative law mechanisms would have to be assessed
against the procedural requirements that constrain the operation of the
sovereign state, which is considered the epitome of publicness.163 In this
way, the CSECC would move closer to the government from which—
under the white gloves strategy—it has been designedly separated. Also,
further demands would be made on the CSECC to bring it under the
control of the parliament. Moreover, as the case of the Basel Committee
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suggests, global administrative law enhances the legitimacy and
accountability of a hybrid body not only through its self-imposed
administrative requirements but also through the incorporation of those
self-imposed requirements into the domestic administrative law. 164
However, this would result in bringing the CSECC into the government
fold. Taken together, these requirements would be linked to political
processes in the constitutional system—a system laden with the character
of the sovereign state. Yet, this is precisely opposite to the direction of
ultra hybrid regulation in which Taiwan’s legal framework of the crossstrait relations has thus far moved.
Delinking itself from any implications of sovereignty, the ultra
hybrid regulation of cross-strait affairs not only precludes the idea of
publicness but also undermines another way of applying the WTO-related
global administrative law rules to cross-strait relations.165 While Taiwan
has been excluded from most international organizations because of
China’s hardline stance of denying legitimacy to Taiwan’s sovereign
claim as a polity, Taiwan and China have been equal members of the
WTO from the perspective of WTO law. It was expected that Taiwan and
China would address their bilateral trade issues on the WTO platform.166
In this way, direct official contact could be initiated between the two sides.
Moreover, WTO law might compensate for the procedure and oversight
deficit in the white gloves strategy as noted above.167 Yet, sticking to its
hardline stance, China has averted the WTO mechanism’s enshrinement as
the means for dealing with its trade issues with Taiwan, even if China has
suffered economic losses due to Taiwan’s WTO-inconsistent
discriminatory measures.168 As a result, the WTO platform does not work
out as the overarching framework governing cross-strait economic and
trade affairs. Moreover, with the signing of the ECFA and the
establishment of the CSECC, the hope for invoking WTO law to
compensate for the existing ultra hybrid regulation of cross-strait affairs is
further diminished.169 Regardless of the statement in its preamble that the
ECFA is signed in accordance with the basic principles of the WTO, the
CSECC rather than the WTO is expected to play the central role in
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governing cross-strait economic and trade issues in the future.170 Again,
this WTO-averse prospect just echoes the adoption of the ultra hybrid
regulation of cross-strait relations.
In sum, attempts to bring the ultra hybrid regulation of cross-strait
relations in line with global administrative law fail because of the
implications for sovereignty arising from the procedural and institutional
requirements of the idea of publicness. As the case of the legal framework
governing the relations between Taiwan and China shows, when it comes
to ultra hybrid regulation, global administrative law reaches its limit in
reining in hybrid/private administration, in that the condition for invoking
the idea of publicness is not satisfied. With the functioning of global
administrative law hampered as well as the oversight mechanisms of the
constitutional state in shambles, the idea of publicness is faced with
double jeopardy in the case of Taiwan’s extraconstitutional hybrid
regulation across the Taiwan Strait.

IV. CONCLUSION
Hybrid regulatory bodies have been credited for functioning as an
institutional bypass around bureaucratic procedures and providing
expedient responses to the changing needs of administrative governance.
As hybrid regulatory bodies are utilized in transnational regulation,
however, concerns have arisen over the lack of transparency and the
evasion of accountability in the face of the informality and flexibility that
is characteristic of hybrid regulatory bodies. The constitutional structure
of checks and balances with respect to foreign affairs is upended with
regulation becoming privatized and administration taking on hybridity.
Transnational hybrid administration not only displaces the idea of
publicness from public administration but also poses fundamental
challenges to the core of democratic legitimacy.
In response, interest has been reinvigorated in the idea of
publicness. Looking beyond the realm of constitutional law, the idea of
publicness is seen as embedded in the underlying principles of
administrative law.
Transposed to the transnational regulatory
environment, the idea of publicness lends legitimacy to global
administrative law. Thus, global administrative law is praised as the
antidote to secrecy and accountability-avoidance caused by the
deployment of hybrid administration in transnational regulation. The
problem of democratic legitimacy concerning transnational hybrid
administration seems to find solution in global administrative law.
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In this article, I examined the issue of democratic legitimacy
resulting from transnational hybrid administration and the proposed
solution by studying the governance framework of the relationship
between Taiwan and China in general and the newly established CSECC
in particular. I argued that the CSECC is deliberately designed to avoid
the institutional features associated with the idea of publicness, exposing
the functional limits of global administrative law. I first analyzed the
legal strategy underpinning the political rapprochement between Taiwan
and China. After revealing the move toward institutionalized hybridity, I
discussed how democratic legitimacy is threatened as hybrid
administration is utilized in the economic regulation across the Taiwan
Strait. On the one hand, transnational hybrid administration displaces the
idea of publicness as legislative oversight over transnational
administrative acts has been seriously weakened by globalization. On the
other hand, global administrative law’s function to keep private/hybrid
administration from running amok at the cost of the public interest is not
unconditional. Rather, as the legal framework governing the relations
between Taiwan and China suggests, global administrative law reaches its
limits in reining in hybrid/private administration when non-publicness
becomes an end in itself.
As the hybrid regulation across the Taiwan Strait shows, both
traditional constitutional design and global administrative law fall short of
restoring the idea of publicness in transnational hybrid administration. It
is true that hybrid administration gains currency in transnational
regulation mainly as a consequence of the changed regulatory
environment. It is also true that global administrative law points to the
direction in which the legitimacy of transnational administration can be
improved. Nevertheless, not only the strengths but also the limits of
global administrative law have to be carefully investigated before we
subscribe to the displacement of the idea of publicness from the
constitution in transnational hybrid administration to the haven of global
administrative law. The case of hybrid regulation across the Taiwan Strait
illustrates the unique regulatory environment in which Taiwan is situated.
Moreover, it alerts us to the exceptional situation in which transnational
hybrid administration may sabotage rule of law mechanisms. Without
taking seriously the withering away of the idea of publicness in the
changing, complicated regulatory environment of our globalized world,
we may risk leaving democratic legitimacy under the siege of uncontrolled
transnational hybrid administration.

